This paper introduces a concept of psychological satisfaction to describe the utility of customers under different psychological perception. It studies the purchase behavior of strategic customers based on their psychological satisfaction and analyzes its impacts on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions and the corresponding profit of retailers. The following conclusions are got in this study. (i) Compared to psychological neutral strategic consumers, the behavior of the psychological elation strategic consumers will further induce the retailer to lower price and reduce inventory, thereby further damaging the profits of the retailer. And the stronger the emotion of psychological elation, the greater the loss of damage.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of economy, competition in product sales is becoming more and more intense. In order to occupy more market share, retailers adopt discounts and other promotional measures to attract consumers to buy. This phenomenon is widespread in physical stores. E-commerce platforms such as Tmall and Jingdong have also increased their trading volume by various price-reduction promotions on festivals. Retailers' promotions make consumers more ''smart''. Consumers will search the price information of products in different periods, and predict the price trend to determine their purchase time. In order to maximize their own utility, such strategic consumers usually choose to wait until mark-down promotions. Consumers have an expectation of the result before making a decision about when to buy.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Nikhil Padhi . However, choosing the purchase time is a risky process and usually faces uncertain results. Consumers want to get the products at a lower cost, but they may face two outcomes if they choose to wait. Different outcomes can lead to different psychological satisfaction. On the one hand, consumers may get the product at a discounted price, which achieves their expected result. At this time, consumers will be psychological elation. On the other hand, the products are in short supply, and the products have been sold out before the discount. At this time, consumers cannot get the product. When the actual result is worse than their expectations, consumers will have a sense of disappointment, and their psychological satisfaction is negative. Different psychological satisfaction will change (increase or decrease) consumers' utility in their economic activities.
Concerning research on revenue management, consumer's strategic behavior has become a common economic phenomenon, which has attracted extensive attention in VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ industry and academia. However, the existing research mainly focuses on the impact of actual economic results on consumers' purchasing behavior. Few research takes into account consumers' psychological perception factors. In this study, we introduce a parameter to describe consumers' psychological satisfaction under uncertain outcomes. We expand the existing research by analyzing the game equilibrium between the retailer's joint pricing and inventory decisions and the purchasing behavior of strategic consumers based on their psychological satisfaction. Based on the equilibrium, the impact of different psychological satisfaction of consumers on retailers' profit can be investigated. The conclusions will not only expand the relevant research on behavioral operations research but also bring management inspiration to some relevant retail firms. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We firstly review related literature in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the model, including model setting, description of consumer's psychological satisfaction and their purchasing decision model based on psychological satisfaction, retailer's joint pricing and inventory decision model. In Section IV, based on the concept of rational expectation equilibrium, the equilibrium of the model is given and the main conclusions about the impacts of consumers' psychological satisfaction and other parameters on the equilibrium have been drawn. In Section V, we illustrate our main results by a specific numerical example. In Section VI, we summarize the full text and give some possible expansions of this study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. NEWSVENDOR MODEL WITH STRATEGIC CONSUMERS
Whether strategic consumers decide to buy usually depends on their expectations of the future price of the products. For instance, Jacobson & Obermiller [1] found that consumers' expectations of the future price of a brand plays a crucial role in the decision to buy now or later. This forward-looking behavior of consumers has been widely concerned by relevant literature in consumer behavior. In the field of economics, Coase [2] first studied strategic consumer behavior in the durable goods market. The research showed that if the price of the product is higher than the marginal production cost, strategic consumers will expect the trend of commodity price and wait for the product price to be reduced, which will eventually lead durable goods monopolists to set the price as the marginal production cost and obtain zero profit.
In the operation management literature concerning strategic consumers, the studies focus on the impact of consumers' strategic buying behavior on retailer's pricing and inventory decisions. In market transactions, the demand for products is random, and retailers need to make optimal decisions under the random needs of consumers. The newsvendor model is a basic optimal ordering model under stochastic demand. Based on the classical newsvendor model, Su & Zhang [3] introduced strategic consumer behavior and utilized the rational expectation hypothesis to study the strategic equilibrium between the retailer and consumers. Wang et al. [4] studied pricing strategies of a seller with budget constraints facing two types of strategic consumers with different search costs and proposes three pricing strategies to motivate all consumers to visit his shop. They found that the selection of the optimal strategy is independent of the composition of consumers but is dependent on the seller's budget level and the difference between the two search costs. Mersereau & Zhang [5] analyzed the pricing and quantity strategies with incomplete information when the retailer could not determine the proportion of strategic consumers. Ye & Sun [6] studied the optimal decision of newsvendor in the face of additive and multiplicative demands when consumers have strategic behavior. Unlike traditional cognition, the study argued that under certain conditions, strategic consumer behavior may have a positive impact on the expected profit of newsvendor under the additive demand. Song & Zhao [7] considered the bounded rationality of strategic consumers, and established an interactive model between consumers and the newsvendor, and analyzed the equilibrium of the model through theoretical and numerical methods. Cachon & Swinney [8] considered a retailer that sells a kind of products with uncertain demand over a finite selling season. They analyzed the benefits of retailers' rapid response by introducing three different types of consumer behavior and found that the advantage of quick response to a retailer is generally much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than without them. Liu & Ryzin [9] studied the incentive of overvalued consumers to buy in advance by manufacturing inventory shortage when consumers are risk-averse. In the model, consumers have different valuations of commodities and take strategic actions to measure the expected payoffs of immediate purchase and delayed purchase by analyzing the retailer's optimal inventory decisions. The results show that limited inventory can alleviate the loss of profits caused by strategic consumers, but it cannot completely eliminate this negative impact.
Our study is also based on the newsvendor model under uncertainty demand, but different from the above research, we further consider the psychological satisfaction of strategic consumers. As shown in our model, psychological satisfaction can affect the purchasing behavior of strategic consumers, which will further affect the retailer's optimal decision-making.
B. MULTI-STAGE SALES MODEL
In order to alleviate the loss of profits caused by strategic consumer behavior, retailers need to adjust the price of products with time and make dynamic pricing of goods. In the literature of operations management, there have been many studies on dynamic pricing. Based on the maximization of consumers' intertemporal utility, Besanko & Winston [10] first included strategic consumer behavior in dynamic pricing research and analyzed the intertemporal pricing of new products sold in monopoly markets. Feng & Xiao [11] established a dynamic pricing model of revenue management, obtained the exact solution in continuous time, and analyzed the concave-convex and monotony of the optimal strategy relative to time. Su [12] developed a model of dynamic pricing with endogenous inter-temporal demand. Contrary to intuition, they found that strategic waiting by customers may sometimes benefit the seller because when low-value customers wait, they compete for availability with high-value customers and thus increase their willingness to pay. Chen & Farias [13] studied the classical dynamic pricing problem of a single kind of products and described the demand intensity under the scale of the external market with a stochastic process. The results showed that simple dynamic pricing rules can perform well for the widely existing Gaussian distribution. Boer & Zwart [14] studied the dynamic pricing problem under a finite inventory of uncertainty demand distribution. Lu [15] introduced an inventory system for perishable items with limited replenishment capacity and inventory-level-dependent demand. With the goal of profit maximization, the optimal joint dynamic pricing and replenishment policy is obtained by solving an optimization problem with Pontryagin's maximum principle.
Our study also deals with multi-period revenue management issues. However, we only consider two phases, which are special cases of dynamic pricing. Our focus is on how different types of psychological satisfaction will affect the retailer's optimal decisions and profits. In our model, the retailer only needs to make price and inventory decisions at one time.
C. CONSUMERS' PSYCHOLOGICAL SATISFACTION
Consumers can predict results when making decisions, but because of uncertainties, actual results often differ from consumers' expectations. Comparing the actual results with the expected, the gap between the results leads to different psychological satisfaction of consumers. Literature on psychology and behavioral decision making has conducted relevant research on the psychological perception of individuals [16] - [18] . Based on these theories, when the actual results exceed their expectations, consumers may be elation, and their psychological satisfaction is positive. When the actual results are worse than their expectations, consumers may be disappointed, and psychological satisfaction is negative.
Taking the highest and lowest prices of the lottery as an example, Bell [19] analyzed the psychological reaction caused by the resulting gap under uncertain decision-making, and explored the ubiquitous of disappointment and integrated it into utility theory. Delquié & Cillo [20] created a richer new model by comparing the results of others to reflect the disappointments that individuals may experience, explaining why classical behavior deviates from normative theory. Gill & Prowse [21] analyzed the average intensity of disappointment aversion and the heterogeneity of disappointment aversion among consumers through computer experiments. Zhang & Zhang [22] studied the effectiveness of pricing commitment and most-favored-customer protection policies with disappointment aversion strategic customers. Quan et al. [23] further investigated the conditions for the effectiveness of quantity commitment strategy with disappointment aversion strategic customers. Baron et al. [24] studied retailer's pricing and inventory decisions with disappointment aversion consumers when selling perishable products. The results showed that retailers' decision-making and consumers regarding inventory and pricing during repeated sales cycles. The interaction of purchase behaviors forms a reference distribution of information that leads to optimal decisions in equilibrium. Liu & Shum [25] analyzed retailer's pricing and inventory decisions with disappointment aversion consumers by studying two periods pricing model. The results showed that disappointment aversion can alleviate the adverse effects of strategic consumer behavior when the price decrease in the second period. However, when the price increase in the second period, whether disappointment aversion can mitigate adverse effects depending on the combination of utility in the two phases. In some literature, regret is alternatively used to describe the situation when consumers make decisions under uncertain. For instance, Nasiry & Popescu [26] characterized the effect of anticipated regret on consumers' decisions and on retailer's profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations.
These studies that consider the psychological factors of consumers are related to our paper. The main differences between our model and these studies are reflected in two aspects. First, we analyzed both disappointment aversion and psychological elation strategic consumers in our model, and have given the corresponding results with these two kinds of consumers. Second, the decision variables in our model and relationship assumption between variables are different from these literatures. For instance, Liu & Shum [25] directly regarded the probability of consumers waiting to buy in the second period obtaining the product as a decision variable of the retailer, whereas in our paper we assume that it is determined by the inventory of the first period. In addition, Liu & Shum [25] assumed that the price in the second stage is the decision variable of the retailer, whereas in our paper is an exogenous parameter.
III. GAME MODEL
We assume that only a retailer sells one kind of product in the market, and the products are sold only in one season. The demand X of consumers in the market is random. Let F(·) and f (·) denote the distribution and density functions of X , respectively. We assume that f (·) is continuous and in a continuous interval. The unit cost of the product is c and consumer's valuation is v. Different from the classic newsvendor model, strategic consumers can choose to buy at regular price p during the sales season, or wait until the end of the sales season and possibly obtain the product at a salvage price s. Suppose that s is an exogenous parameter and s < c < v. The retailer needs to make decisions on the regular price p and the ordering quantity Q. The retailer's decision will influence the decision of consumers to buy immediately or wait for purchase.
Because consumers are strategic, when they realize that products can be obtained at a lower price after the end of the sales season, they may delay their purchase. For example, when the regular price is too high, consumers may choose to wait until the arrival of the residual market. They suppose that waiting is worthwhile, although they may take the risk that products are sold out at the end of the season. Let r denote consumers' reserve price, which depends on the probability that consumers can obtain the product in the residual market. If the probability of consumers the product with salvage price is positive, then r < v; if this probability is zero, then r = v. The probability that consumers can obtain the product in the residual market depends on the retail's ordering quantity Q. The decision sequence and events between consumers and the retailer are as follows.
(i) Before the selling season, the retailer decides the selling price and ordering quantity according to his belief in the consumer's reserve price.
(ii) At the beginning of the selling season, consumers observe the selling price and decide whether to buy immediately according to their valuation and belief of the probability that products can be purchased in the salvage market (depends on the inventory quantity).
(iii) Products are sold at regular price.
(iv) At the end of the sales period, the market demand is realized, and all residual products are cleared at the salvage price.
A. CONSUMERS' DECISION MODEL
We consider the effects of the psychological satisfaction of consumers on their purchasing behavior based on theories of Bell [19] and Liu & Shum [25] in this paper. Bell [19] proposed a simple model of psychological disappointment and elation to capture the psychological satisfaction of consumers with uncertain economic payoffs. In the model, the total utility perceived by consumers who face uncertainty is a linear combination of the economic payoff and the psychological reaction of disappointment (or elation). That is, Utility = economic payoff + psychological satisfaction. Liu & Shum [25] illustrated the utility function in Bell's model with a general two-outcome model as
We can suppose a situation that a customer faces a gamble in which she can earn either a payoff of x with probability p or a payoff of y with probability 1 − p, where x > y. Therefore, her expected economic payoff is given by u = xp + y(1 − p). Following Bell's model, the perceived utility includes a psychological disappointment proportional to u − y if the payoff turns out to be y, or includes a psychological elation proportional to x − u if the realized payoff is x, where e ≥ 0 is the degree to which a unit of elation affects the customer utility and d ≥ 0 is the degree to which a unit of disappointment affects her utility. Therefore, the total expected utility is
where k = d −e, k is the difference in the degree to which disappointment and elation affect utility. When k = 0, the psychological disappointment and elation affect the customer's utility in the same degree. When k > 0, the psychological disappointment experienced by customers is greater than the psychological elation for the same amount of difference between realized outcomes and expectations. When k < 0, consumers are more pronounced to the psychological elation than disappointment. In reality, consumers can observe the price, but cannot observe the inventory quantity of the retailer. However, consumers can have a belief in the inventory quantity of the retailer. Because the inventory quantity essentially affects the probability that consumers can obtain the product in the salvage market, we directly let ξ p denote consumers' belief in the probability that they can obtain the product in the residual market.
In the market, when consumers make decisions, they can choose to purchase the product immediately at regular price p; or wait until the end of the sales season to obtain the product at the salvage price s. But another result of waiting is that products have been sold out during the sales season. That is to say, consumers suppose that they can get the product with probability ξ p , or cannot get the product with probability 1 − ξ p (denoted as ξ p ) when they wait. When consumers choose to buy immediately at the regular price p, the economic payoff is v−p. When consumers choose to wait, they will get economic payoff v − s with probability ξ p , or get zero economic payoff with probability 1 − ξ p . When consumers get economic payoff v − s, they will be elation. The greater the value, the higher the degree of excitement. Because psychological satisfaction is positive, this psychological factor will increase consumers' utility. When consumers get zero economic payoffs, they will be disappointed, and their psychological satisfaction will be negative, which will decrease consumers' utility. According to (1) , the utility of strategic consumers waiting for purchase is
Obviously,
, the utility of buying immediately is greater than waiting for purchase, and consumers will choose to buy immediately; otherwise, consumers choose to wait for the purchase.
B. RETAILER'S DECISION MODEL
The retailer's decisions include regular pricing p and ordering quantity Q. The profit function is
where ''∧'' is the minimum operator, (x) + = max(x, 0). The price p affects the decision of consumers whether to buy immediately. The inventory Q affects the probability of consumers can obtain the product in the salvage market, which indirectly affects the decision of consumers whether to buy immediately.
Since in reality, the retailer cannot observe consumers' reserve price r for the product, the retailer can form a belief ξ r . In order to maximize the profits, the retailer will choose a price that equals his belief in consumers' reserve price, that is p = ξ r .
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Definition 1: Rational Expectation Equilibrium (RE equilibrium). The strategy combination of consumers and the retailer (buy immediately, (p, Q) ) is a RE equilibrium if and only if parameters (p, Q, r, ξ p , ξ r ) satisfy the following conditions:
Condition (i) indicates that consumers will choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their belief ξ p (buy immediately at regular price or wait to buy until salvage price). Conditions (ii) and (iii) mean that the retailer will make the price and inventory decisions that maximize their profits based on their belief in consumers' reservation price, as discussed above. The final two conditions require that all expectations must be consistent with the actual outcomes. In (iv), the expectations ξ p must concur with the actual probability of obtaining the product if an individual consumer waits for the sale. Because in equilibrium, the seller will price the product at consumers' reservation price, and all consumers will buy the product. Only when X < Q, a waiting consumer can get the product at the salvage price. Therefore, when an individual consumer waits, he will obtain the product with probability F(Q), which must be consistent with his belief ξ p , as shown in (iv).
According to the definition of RE equilibrium, when the value of k satisfies
, the retailer's optimal pricing is p = v; Otherwise, the retailer's pricing and inventory decisions are equivalent to solving the following problem.
v
Lemma 1: In RE equilibrium, all consumers buy immediately at the regular price p, and the retailer's optimal pricing and inventory are characterized by
where F(Q) = 1 − F(Q). Bring (6) into (4), we can get the critical price p for consumers to buy immediately which
Then the retailer's pricing p in RE equilibrium must be the zero point of G(p) in the interval (c, v).
V. INFLUENCE OF PARAMETERS ON EQUILIBRIUM A. INFLUENCE OF PARAMETER k
We first discuss the simplest case of k = 0, in which consumers have neutral psychological satisfaction and G(p)
. Lemma 2 compares the retailer's optimal strategies (or maximum profit) when facing strategic consumers with neutral psychological satisfaction and the situation without strategic consumers.
Lemma 2: Let p * 1 , Q * 1 and π * 1 , respectively, denote the optimal pricing, inventory and maximum profit of the retailer when facing strategic consumers with neutral psychological satisfaction. Let p * 0 , Q * 0 and π * 0 , respectively, denote the optimal pricing, inventory and maximum profit of the classic newsvendor model without strategic consumers. Then p * 0 > p * 1 , Q * 0 > Q * 1 and π * 0 > π * 1 . Lemma 2 indicates that consumers' strategic behavior will induce the retailer to decrease pricing and inventory, thereby damaging the retailer's profit. We can further analyze the influence of consumers' psychological satisfaction parameter k on the RE equilibrium. Proposition 1 gives comparisons of equilibrium results for different types of strategic consumers with different k. Proposition 1: Let p * 2 , Q * 2 and π * 2 , respectively, denote the optimal pricing, inventory and maximum profit of the retailer in the face of psychological elation strategic consumers. Let p * 3 , Q * 3 and π * 3 , respectively, denote the optimal pricing, inventory and maximum profit of the retailer in the face of disappointment aversion strategic consumers. Compared with strategic consumers whose psychological satisfaction is neutral, there are the following conclusions.
(i) p * 2 < p * 1 , Q * 2 < Q * 1 and π * 2 < π * 1 . For psychological elation consumers (k < 0), when other parameters are fixed, the stronger the psychological elation (the smaller in k), the lower the optimal pricing p * 2 , the smaller the inventory Q * 2 , and the smaller the maximum profit π * 2 . (ii) p * 3 > p * 1 , Q * 3 > Q * 1 and π * 3 > π * 1 . For disappointment aversion consumers (k > 0), there is critical value k > 0. When 0 < k < k and other parameters are fixed, the stronger the disappointment aversion (the larger in k), the higher the optimal pricing p * 3 , the greater the inventory Q * 3 , and the larger the maximum profit π * 3 . Proposition 1 shows that consumers' psychological elation preference will further lead the retailer to decrease pricing and inventory, which will cause greater damage to the retailer's profit. However, consumers' disappointment aversion preference can stimulate the retailer to increase pricing and inventory, thus increasing the retailer's profit. Consumer disappointment aversion is conducive to mitigating the profit loss caused by consumer strategic behavior.
B. INFLUENCE OF PARAMETERS c, s, v
For the fixed psychological satisfaction parameter k, we can analyze the impacts of cost c, consumer's valuation v and salvage price s on the retailer's strategies. Since when G(p) has no zero points, the optimal price p * 3 is equal to the consumer's valuation v. We only discuss the case when G(p) has zero points. Proposition 2 draws corresponding conclusions about their influence relationship. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. For different types of strategic consumers (k = −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5), the functional relationship between the retailer's a) optimal pricing, b) inventory, c) maximum profit and parametercunder the RE equilibrium.
Proposition 2:
When G(p) has zero points in the interval (c, v) (there is k > 0, when k < k, it can be satisfied), then under RE equilibrium, all consumers will buy immediately. The relationships between p * , Q * , π * and parameters c, s, v are as follows.
(i) When other parameters are fixed, the optimal pricing p * increases with the increase in cost c, and the optimal inventory Q * decreases with the increase in c. There isĉ, when s < c <ĉ, the maximum profit π * increases with the increase in c, whereas whenĉ < c < v, π * decreases with the increase in c.
(ii) When other parameters are fixed, the optimal pricing p * decreases with the increase in salvage price s, and the optimal inventory Q * increases with the increase ins. There isŝ, when 0 < s <ŝ, the maximum profit π * increases with the increase in s, whereas whenŝ < s < c, π * decreases with the increase in s.
(iii) When other parameters are fixed, the optimal pricing p * increases with the increase in valuation v, and the optimal inventory Q * increases with the increase in v. The maximum profit π * increases with the increase in v.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we illustrate the above conclusions by a specific example. Let the stochastic demand obey the normal distribution, X ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), that is the mean µ = 10 and the variance σ 2 = 20. Table 1 shows the optimal pricing, inventory and maximum profit of the retail in RE equilibrium for default parameter values s = 1, c = 2, v = 4 and under several different values of k. Figures 1 to 3 show the functional relationship of optimal pricing p * , inventory Q * , and maximum profit π * , respectively, with respect to parameters c, s and v, respectively, for several different values of k.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, there has been much research on strategic consumer behavior in the fields of operation management and supply chain management. In the literature of retailer revenue management, most studies only consider the economic payoff of strategic consumers on their purchase decisions, based on which the optimal pricing and inventory decisions of the retailer can be analyzed. However, consumers' psychological factors also have an influence on their utility and therefore their purchasing decisions. In this background, this paper introduced a parameter to describe consumers' psychological satisfaction and studied the influence of different psychological satisfaction of strategic consumers on the retailer's decision-making and profits. Our results show that strategic consumers with psychological elation will further damage the retailer's profits, whereas consumers with disappointment aversion will mitigate the loss of profits caused by their strategic behavior to some extent. Parameters of psychological satisfaction, production cost, salvage price, and consumer's valuation of products on the decision equilibrium between the two sides have also been investigated.
In future research, this paper can be extended in the following aspects. Firstly, this paper only studies the effect of consumers' psychological satisfaction on the retailer's optimal decision and it can be extended to the whole supply chain management situation. In addition, the degree of consumers' satisfaction in this article is constant, but in reality, the level of consumer satisfaction may be heterogeneous. In future research, we can analyze how the retailer or the whole supply chain can take measures to cope with the adverse effects of strategic consumers when consumers have different levels of psychological satisfaction. Finally, this paper assumes that the salvage price is exogenous. In practice, the residual value may be related to the remaining inventory. The larger the remaining inventory, the lower the salvage price. In future research, we can consider how the retailer's profit changes when the salvage price depends on the remaining inventory. (iii) When other parameters are fixed and v changes, equation (7) determines that the optimal inventory Q * is an implicit function of v, namely, Q * = Q * (v). It can easily be proved by taking derivative of Q * (v), P * (v, Q * ) = P(v, Q * (v)) and * (v, Q * ) = (v, Q * (v)), respectively, with respect to v. Proposition 2 has been proven.
